Professional Secrecy and Privileged Communications by Robert E. Regan, O.S.A. & John T. Macartney
The Catholic Lawyer 
Volume 2 
Number 1 Volume 2, January 1956, Number 1 Article 2 
April 2016 
Professional Secrecy and Privileged Communications 
Robert E. Regan, O.S.A. 
John T. Macartney 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/tcl 
 Part of the Catholic Studies Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Robert E. Regan, O.S.A. and John T. Macartney (1956) "Professional Secrecy and Privileged 
Communications," The Catholic Lawyer: Vol. 2 : No. 1 , Article 2. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/tcl/vol2/iss1/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in The Catholic Lawyer by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
PROFESSIONAL SECRECY
AND PRIVILEGED
COMMUNICATIONS
ROBERT E. REGAN, O.S.A.t
JOHN T. MACARTNEY*
O UR MODERN PUBLIC LIFE has greatly increased the complexity of
human relationships and has presented moral theologians and
moral philosophers with a heavy task in analyzing the new situations and
properly applying to them the old and constant moral principles. In many
respects the courts have similar problems of analysis and application of
precedent. A changing order produces unfortunate tendencies in addi-
tion to benefits. There is discernible in certain quarters, a tendency to
make public opinion a standard of right conduct. The changing order
has also produced a lessening appreciation on the part of the public of
their fundamental rights. These weaknesses in the social structure sug-
gest the need for seasonal rehearsal of the corresponding rights and
duties of the professions and public alike.
Of the many duties incumbent upon the professional person the duty
of secrecy is neither the most nor the least important either in matters
moral or in matter of jurisprudence. It does not present a problem cry-
ing most for attention, but rather one worthy of attention and worthy
of periodic re-examination in the light of changing circumstances. The
theme proposed here is the consideration of the moral and legal aspects
of the duty of professional secrecy in the three great professions:
religion, law and medicine.
t M.A., S.T.D.; Associate Professor of Religion, Villanova University.
- B.S., LL.B.; Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law.
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Professional Secrecy Defined
The moral theologian and ethician de-
fine professional secrecy as a special moral
duty, binding in both commutative and
legal justice upon members of the several
professions, whereby they are obligated to
maintain a virtuous or discreet silence in
respect of confidential information re-
ceived by them in the course of duty.' The
duty stems from commutative justice in so
far as secrecy is required to protect the
rights of either physical or moral persons
to various bona, for example, the right to
reputation. It arises from legal justice in so
far as it is necessary for the common wel-
fare (bonum commune) that persons who
are in distress of soul or mind or body be
not unduly restrained from seeking the as-
sistance of qualified persons. And it is the
common judgment of moralists and ethi-
cians that individuals in such distress would
be restrained from seeking such assistance
- with incalculable harm to society - if
they had no assurance that their confidences
would not be betrayed by those persons to
whom they might appeal for help.
The faithful observance of secrets of
trust stems from the natural law2 and this
duty exists regardless of the prescriptions
1 REGAN, PROFESSIONAL SECRECY IN THE LIGHT
OF MORAL PRINCIPLES 47 (1943).
2 AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, I-I1, q.70, art.
1, ad 2.
On the other hand sometimes they [secrets of
trust] are such as one is not bound to make
known, so that one may be under obligation
not to do so on account of their being com-
mitted ... tinder secrecy. In such a case one is
by no means bound to make them known,
even if the superior should command; because
to keep faith is of natural right, and a man
cannot be commanded to do what is contrary
to natural right. (Fathers of the English Domin-
ican Province transl. 1947.)
of the laws of nations. In varying degrees
the law has taken into account the duty of
professional secrecy in the great profes-
sions and has made certain provisions for
its observance. Nevertheless, the gap be-
tween the natural and legal prescription is
significant.
The Priest-Penitent Relation
The Code of Canon Law imposes the
duty of secrecy on various ecclesiastical
officials. 3 Of the many secret communica-
tions thus protected, the secrecy of confes-
sional communications is most sacrosanct.
4
The priest's duty of professional secrecy,
and, in particular, his duty of confessional
secrecy, has been accorded varying degrees
of recognition in the laws of nations. In
countries whose system of jurisprudence is
based on the civil law, it is not uncommon
to find the confessional secret protected by
criminal sanctions as well as by a privilege
of non-disclosure in the courts of justice.5
It is at best debatable whether the duty of
secrecy was recognized in England prior to
the Restoration; however, there is com-
plete accord that from the time of the Res-
toration in England, and in the United
States, the privilege was not recognized as
a rule of the common law.6 In many of our
states a privilege of the penitent has been
created by statute in respect of confidential
communications made to a priest, clergy-
3CODE OF CANON LAw, e.g., Can. 243, §2; 364,
§2, no. 3; 1105.
4 Id. 889. The sacramental seal. 1. The sacra-
mental seal is inviolable; therefore the confes-
sor shall scrupulously take care that he may not
by word or sign or in any way or for any reason
betray the sinner.
5 REGAN, PROFESSIONAL SECRECY IN THE LIGHT
OF MORAL PR!NCIPLES, c. VIII, §2 (1943).
6 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2394 (3d ed. 1940).
JANUARY, 1956
man or minister of the gospel, in his pro-
fessional capacity, "in the course of dis-
cipline enjoined" by the rules or practice
of the church or religious denomination
to which he belongs. 7 The penitent's priv-
ilege is also embodied in the Model Codes
and in the Uniform Rules of Evidence.9
Nevertheless, there is no statutory grant of
the privilege in seventeen American juris-
dictions.10
The Attorney-Client Relation
Confidential communications between
attorney and client are protected by one of
the oldest privileges in the history of the
common law. Recognition of the profes-
sional duty of secrecy was based initially
upon objective considerations for the oath
and honor of the attorney. This considera-
tion gradually gave way to the subjective
interest of the client's freedom of apprehen-
sion in consulting his attorney." Today it
is generally accepted that a client has a
privilege that confidential communications
between the client and his attorney will not
be disclosed in court.' 2 In addition, the at-
torney's obligation of professional secrecy
is expressed in the Canons of Professional
7 Compare N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act §351 (limiting
protection to the confessional relation) with
Minn. Stat. Ann. §595.02 (3) (Supp. 1954) (ex-
tending the privilege to communications made to
a clergyman by one seeking religious or spiritual
advice or comfort). The statutes are listed in 8
WIOMORE, EVIDENCE §2395 n. 1 (3d ed. 1940).
8 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 219 (1942).
9 UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE rule 29.
10 Ala.; Conn.; Del.; Fla.; Ill.; Md.; Me.; Mass.;
Miss.; N.H.; N.C.; Pa.; R.I.; S.C.; Tenn.; Tex.; Va.
11 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§2290, 2291 (3d ed.
1940).
12 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 210 (1942);
UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE rule 26 (1); 8
WIGMORE. EVIDENCE §2292 (3d ed. 1940).
Ethics 13 and is recognized by the Church
relative to ecclesiastical trials.' 4
The Physician-Patient Relation
The physician's duty of secrecy in re-
spect of the confidences of his patient has
been acknowledged from ancient times as
one involving every element of trust and
confidence. It is the cornerstone of the
Hippocratic Oath.1 5 The duty is respected
in the laws and moral teachings of the
Church, 16 in the codes of the civil law na-
tions, 17 and is revered as a cardinal ethical
principle within the medical profession it-
self.' 8 However, the secrecy of confidences
given to a physician was not considered
privileged in the English common law. 19
13 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CANONS OF PRO-
FESSIONAL ETHICS, Canon 37 (1937).
14 CODE OF CANON LAW, Can. 1755, §2, n. 1.
15 ". . . And whatsoever I shall see or hear in the
course of my profession in my intercourse with
men, if it be what should not be published
abroad, I will never divulge, holding such things
to be holy secrets." JONES, THE DOCTOR'S OATH,
9-11 (1924).
16 For recognition in the laws of the Church
see note 14 supra. For the moral teachings of
the Church on this duty of the physician (as
well as of the attorney) one may consult any
standard handbook in moral theology, or special
treatises such as CONNELL, MORALS IN POLITICS
AND PROFESSIONS (1946), or MCFADDEN, MEDI-
CAL ETHICS (1953).
17 REGAN, PROFESSIONAL SECRECY IN THE LIGHT
OF MORAL PRINCIPLES, C. VIII, §2 (1943).
18 AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, PRINCIPLES
OF MEDICAL ETHICS, c. It, §1 (1939).
19 In the Duchess of Kingston's Trial, 20 How.
St. Tr. 573 (1776), this principle was enunci-
ated by L. C. J. Mansfield: ".... If a surgeon was
voluntarily to reveal these secrets, to be sure, he
would be guilty of a breach of honor and of
great indiscretion; but to give that information
in a court of justice, which by the law of the
land he is bound to do, will never be imputed
to him as any indiscretion whatever." See 8
WIGMORE, EvIDENCE §2380 (3d ed. 1940).
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This common law rule obtains in seventeen
states today.20 The remaining states, fol-
lowing the precedent set by New York,2 1
have created by statute a privilege of the
patient that information conveyed to a
physician in the course of consultation be
not disclosed in court. 22 The statutes vary
in their terms and are subject to certain
limitations necessary to the protection of
the common weal. 23
Liberating Factors
Consent-Waiver
If one excepts the confessional secret
which is sui generis, it may be said that
neither the moral duty of secrecy, whether
resting on the priest, the attorney, or the
physician, nor the privilege, whether that of
the penitent, the client or the patient, is
absolute. The moralists recognize the effects
of certain "liberating" factors to a degree
comparable to the operation of the doctrine
of waiver in law. For example, it is the view
of moral theologians and ethicians that the
20 CHAFEE, Privileged Communications: Is Jus-
tice Served or Obstructed by Closing the Doc-
tor's Mouth on the Witness Stand?, 52 YALE
L. J. 607 (1943).
21 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2380 n. 4 (3d ed.
1940).
22 8 id. §2380 n. 5. See note 20 supra.
23 MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 109
(ALI 1954). ". .. In some the privilege applies
only in civil cases; in some it is made expressly
inapplicable in actions against a physician for
malpractice; in some there are provisions for
waiver. In about half the states the Uniform
Narcotic Drugs Act makes specifically unprivi-
leged communications made to a physician 'in
an effort unlawfully to procure a narcotic drug,
or unlawfully to procure the administration of
any such drug.' And it is generally provided in
Workmen's Compensation Acts that a physician
may be required to testify to information pro-
cured in attending the claimant."
consent of the proprietor or owner of the
secret will normally free the professional
person from the obligation of secrecy. 24
Generally the same view is maintained in
the law, to the effect that the privilege may
be waived by the holder 25
Publication
Again with the exception of the confes-
sional secret, when a fact becomes public
knowledge the right to secrecy is gener-
ally lost. 26 The moralists, in enunciating
this principle, caution that in the case of
24 1 AERTNYS-DAMEN, THEOLOGIA MORALIS, no.
1004 (13th ed. 1939).
By the term "owner" of a secret here and else-
where is meant the person seeking professional
help, whether client, patient, or penitent. The ex-
pression takes its origin in the fact that moralists
and ethicians regard a secret as a kind of property,
on the par with, or even greater than, material
possessions, over which a person exercises do-
minion. In consequence they speak of a man as
having the right to possess, use, and dispose of his
secrets. The violation of another's right to tranquil
possession of his secrets is often characterized as
theft. It might be useful to note here that some
secrets are held jointly by a number of persons,
e.g., by a family or a corporation, and in such
cases the consent of the various owners would
have to be obtained before disclosure would be
lawful.
The MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE and the UNI-
FORM RULES OF EVIDENCE both use the term
"holder" instead of owner.
25 In re Associated Gas & Electric Co., 59 F.
Supp. 743 (S.D. N.Y. 1944); Seeger v. Odell,
64 Cal. App. 2d 397, 148 P. 2d 901 (1944);
Everett v. Everett, 319 Mich. 475, 29 N.W. 2d
919 (1947); New York. Life Ins. Co. v. New-
man, 311 Mich. 368, 18 N.W. 2d 859 (1945);
Demonbrun v. McHaffie, 348 Mo. 1120, 156
S.W. 2d 923 (1942); MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE
rule 231 (1942); UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE
rule 37; 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§2327, 2388
(3d ed. 1940).
26 1 LEHMKUHL, THEOLOGIA MORALIS, no. 1445,
iv. (1914).
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professional secrecy the danger of possible
scandal would have to be obviated, and
also suggest as a caveat the danger that the
professional person's disclosure might con-
firm as factual what up to that point might
have been mere rumor or guesswork. It
would appear that the doctrine of waiver
is not as broad in scope as the moral code
and while authority is scanty, public dis-
closure by the holder should constitute
waiver. 27
Threatened Harm
Should secrecy be maintained despite
threatened harm? The applicable rule of
law is well settled to the effect that a com-
munication to an attorney or physician is
not privileged if it is made for the purpose
of securing aid to enable the communicator
to commit a crime or a tort involving
fraud. 28 And it is asserted that the same
rule must be applied to non-fraudulent
wrongs29 since the privilege is justifiable
only on the theory that preservation of
secrecy will produce a general social benefit
of greater value than would the disclosure
of the truth. It is difficult to find authority
27 See MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 231
(1942); UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE rule 37.
Compare 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§2327, 2388
(3d ed. 1940).
28 United States v. Bob, 106 F. 2d 37 (2d Cir.
1939); Cramer v. State, 145 Neb. 88, 15 N.W.
2d 323 (1944) (In prosecution for murder of
defendant's infant child, physician allowed to
testify that defendant requested him to perform
an abortion on defendant's wife prior to birth
of child.); MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rules 212,
222 (1942); UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE rules
26 (2) (a), 27 (6); CHAFEE, Privileged Com-
nunications: Is Justice Served or Obstructed by
Closing the Doctor's Mouth on the Witness
Stand?, 52 YALE L.J. 607 (1943).
29 Cf. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2298 (3d ed. 1940);
MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 212 (1942).
for the application of these principles of
law to the priest-penitent relation. And it
is worthy of note that, subject to what has
been said above, the admissibility of an at-
torney's or physician's testimony concern-
ing confidential communications appears to
depend upon whether the privilege is ap-
plicable and operative rather than upon
considerations of threatened harm. From
the viewpoint of the moral theologian and
ethician, the "liberating" factors most
commonly arise when the revelation or re-
tention of the secret might be necessary to
avert some threatening harm. There are at
least four possible areas of harm: to the
community, to the owner of the secret, to
the professional person, and to an innocent
third person.
1. To the Community
The secrecy of the Confessional, since it
touches upon the sacramental and super-
natural order, is, as has been stated pre-
viously, in a class by itself or sui generis;
and hence is not subject to merely human
considerations.30 But even from the view-
point of the common welfare a case can
be made out for its absolute inviolability,
since the observance of such secrecy is
necessary for the supernatural good of the
whole of the higher of the two perfect so-
cieties. Accordingly, the confessional seal
may not be broken for the purpose of pre-
venting harm that threatens the bonum
commune.
30 2 AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, I-II, q. 70,
art. 1, ad 2. "A man should by no means give
evidence on matters secretly committed to him
in confession, because he knows such things,
not as a man but as God's minister: and the
sacrament is more binding than any human pre-
cept." (Fathers of the English Dominican
Province transl. 1947).
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In respect of the professional duty of se-
crecy of the attorney and the physician (as
well as the non-sacramental duty of se-
crecy of the priest), all theologians agree
in principle with St. Thomas that it is not
lawful to receive any secret against the
common good. 31 Since the time of St.
Thomas, theologians have introduced the
consideration that since the observance of.
professional secrecy is itself necessary for
the common good, then not any and every
consideration of the common welfare
would warrant relaxation of the obligation
of professional secrecy.3 2 It is the common
teaching of theologians that the mere ad-
vantage that society might gain, such as
the punishment of a crime that might
31 Id., 11-11., q. 68, art. 1, ad 3. "It is contrary to
fidelity to make known secrets to the injury of a
person; but not if they be revealed for the good
of the community, which should always be pre-
ferred to a private good. Hence it is unlawful to
receive any secret in detriment to the common
good ... " Ibid.
St. Thomas is equally emphatic but more spe-
cific in his reply to the second objection in the 1st
article of Question 70, where he says in part:
"Sometimes they [secrets of trust] are of such a
nature that one is bound to make them known
as soon as they come to our knowledge, for in-
stance if they conduce to the spiritual or cor-
poral corruption of the community.... Against
such a duty a man cannot be obliged to act on
the plea that the matter is committed to him
under secrecy .. I" d. at page 1493.
Obvious examples of what St. Thomas means
by secrets in detriment to the common good or
that conduce to the spiritual or corporal corrup-
tion of the community would be threatened
sabotage at local, state, or federal level, treason-
able plots, subversive activities generally, dis-
eases that might threaten to take on epidemic
proportions. St. Thomas would also include in
this category the dissemination of doctrines that
would threaten to undermine men's supernatural
faith or morals.
32 3 AERTNYS-DAMEN, THEOLOGIA MORALIs, no.
1250 (13th ed. 1939).
otherwise go unpublished, will not justify
the lifting of the obligation of professional
secrecy. 33 Likewise, it is a settled point of
moral doctrine that the harm which ap-
pears to authorize the revelation of a pro-
fessional secret must be actually impending
or at least constitute a serious future
threat. 34 There is not unanimity, however,
with regard to the gravity that is required
in the threatening evil in order that the ob-
ligation of the secret may be lawfully set
aside. The common teaching of the moral-
ists is that the obligation of professional
secrecy ceases whenever this measure is
urgently necessary for warding off a seri-
ous evil (damnum grave) from the com-
mon welfare. 35 A few theologians have de-
manded that the threatening evil be most
serious (damnum gravissimum) before the
obligation ceases to bind. 36 It is believed
that under either test a physician's duty of
secrecy would yield to the common good
and require the disclosure of a patient's
having a disease such as syphillis that
would pose a serious threat to the health of
the community, notwithstanding the pa-
tient's insistence upon secrecy.
With regard to liberating factors and the
common good, two further points should
be noted. First, when it is a question of
protecting the common welfare it is not
necessary that the person whose secret is
threatening harm be the formally unjust
no. 180, 1 (2d and 3d ed. 1923).
33 2 PRUMMER, MANUALE THEOLOGIAE MORALIS.
authorities; see also note 48 infra.
34 Cf. 6 BILLUART, SUMMA SANCTI THOMAE,
diss. 13, a. 1 (1886).
35 See REGAN, PROFESSIONAL SECRECY IN THE
LIGHT OF MORAL PRINCIPLES 102 (1943), listing
36 See 2 KENRICK, THEOLOGIA MORALS, no. 123
(1842).
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cause 37 of the threatening evil. Second,
whenever it becomes lawful to reveal or
otherwise use a professional secret in order
to safeguard the common welfare, it auto-
matically becomes obligatory to do so. Per-
missibility of disclosure and obligation to
disclose need not always go hand in hand.
In this case they do go hand in hand.
2. Harm to the Owner
Moralists agree that the natural or
promised secret must be revealed if its re-
tention would result in grave harm to the
owner of the secret.38 But they differ in
their opinion on this matter when the pro-
fessional secret is involved. The prevailing
view is that charity demands that the owner
be safeguarded from serious harm, even
if it be necessary to reveal the professional.
secret in order to achieve this objective,39
37 The expression "formally unjust cause" is
highly technical, and since it is used in numer-
ous places throughout this article it might well
be explained here. The term "cause" signifies
anything that contributes by its very nature and
proper force to the production of something else,
and is usually distinguished in this context from
the term "occasion." Thus A commits a crime
for which B is convicted on circumstantial evi-
dence. If the erroneous conviction was not con-
trived by A, then A's original criminal activity
would be designated as the "occasion" but not
the "cause" of B's sad plight. Further, one is said
to be the "unjust" cause of another's evil if by his
causal activity he had violated a strict right of
that other person, such as the right to life or
bodily integrity, the right to reputation, the
right to property. Finally, a person is said to be
the "formally" unjust cause of another's evil
when added to the foregoing concepts there is
the additional note of "subjective" guilt, that is,
the person realizes that he is doing wrong and
nonetheless voluntarily does it.
38 See REGAN4, PROFESSIONAL SECRECY IN THE
LIGHT OF MORAL PRINCIPLES 40 and notes page
103 (1943).
39 Id. at 104, n. 22 listing the authorities which
include St. Thomas, St. Alphonsus, Aertnys-
Damen, Merkelbach and Davis.
and even in situations where the owner ex-
presses his unwillingness to have the revel-
ation take place. In such cases, as a matter
of moral law, the owner is considered to
be "unreasonably" unwilling.40 Thus it is
thought that a patient who makes serious
threats to commit suicide or who otherwise
manifests genuine suicidal tendencies could
not reasonably object to his physician's
making such use of this knowledge as
would be necessary to avert such a trag-
edy. A minority of moralists adhere to the
principle that the common good achieved
by maintaining professional secrecy takes
precedence over the private good of the
owner of the secret. 41 In view of this dif-
ference of opinion the professional person
is morally free, though not morally obli-
gated, to make the disclosure necessary to
save the owner from himself. And since
the duty to disclose, even where it is con-
sidered to exist, is one of charity only, it
would not oblige in the face of proportion-
ately grave inconvenience to the profes-
sional person.
Many of the hypothetical cases which
come to mind concerning communications
made to an attorney or to a physician and
involving possible harm to the communi-
cator will not be protected by the law in
the form of a privilege for one reason or
40 2 MERKELBACH, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE MORALIS,
no. 855, 3b (2d ed. 1935).
41 See REGAN, PROFESSIONAL SECRECY IN THE
LIGHT OF MORAL PRINCIPLES 40 and notes page
103 (1943).
In other words, these theologians consider dis-
closures of this kind to have a weakening effect on
the structure of professional secrecy itself; and so
they judge that the good accruing to the common
welfare through keeping the structure of the duty
intact should take precedence over the advantage
that might come to an individual by a relaxing of
the duty.
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another. The communications will fall
either within the rule which denies the pro-
tection of the privilege to communications
invoiving the commission of crimes or torts
in the future, or they will not be considered
relevant to the purposes for which advice or
treatment was sought (e.g., a disclosure by
the client or patient that he is planning to
commit suicide). However, cases are not
beyond the pale of imagination which
might not admit the same solution. For ex-
ample, Attorney L represents A who has
been indicted, convicted, and sentenced to
die for murdering X. During the course of
the relationship, A, in asserting his inno-
cence, disclosed that his brother, B, killed
X, and also disclosed the location of the
murder weapon containing B's fingerprints,
which location prior to this revelation A
alone knew. The circumstantial evidence
introduced at the trial was so overwhelm-
ing in its conviction of A, that B's confes-
sion at this time would be meaningless
without producing the weapon. Neverthe-
less, A steadfastly refuses to disclose the
location of the weapon to the authorities,
to B, or to anyone else, and refuses to re-
lease attorney L from his bond of secrecy.
While it is difficult to find any precedent
in the law which would free L from his
duty of secrecy, according to the principles
of moral theology enunciated above, the
attorney would be morally free to reveal
the secret, at least to the extent necessary
to protect the client from himself.
3. Harm to the Professional Person
The situation may arise wherein the dis-
closure of a professional secret may be
necessary to protect the professional re-
cipient himself from harm. Would he, in
such a case, be morally free to make the
necessary disclosure? The answer depends
in large measure upon whether or not the
owner is the formally unjust cause of the
threatening harm.
In the case where the owner of the secret
is not the formally unjust cause, there is
substantial accord among moral theo-
logians that where the observance of the
obligation of professional secrecy would
involve the risk of very grave harm (dam-
num gravissimum) to the professional per-
son the obligation of secrecy ceases to bind,
and, where possible, notice of the termi-
nation of the obligation should be given to
the client or patient. 42 Where the risk of
harm threatening the professional person is
grave (damnum grave), but not most grave
or most serious, the moral authorities have
differed in their opinions; and in the several
opinions it is not always clear whether they
have the professional secret precisely in
mind, or are referring to a lesser type of
entrusted secret, such as one arising out of
the relation of principal and agent.4 3 The
42 2 MERKELBACH, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE MORALIS,
no. 855, 3d (2d ed. 1935).
Thus, for example, an attorney might be forced
at gun-point to disclose a client's admission of
guilt to the client's opponent, or, similarly, a
physician might be coerced into throwing open his
medical records to someone seeking blackmail
material on one of his patients.
43 3 ST. ALPHONsUs, THEOLOGIA MORALIS, no.
971, 4 (1879) states three views on the question
as follows: (a) That it would not be lawful -to
reveal an entrusted secret in order to avoid
grave harm (citing as authorities Alexander,
Scotus, Sylvius, Reginaldus, and St. Thomas);
(b) That the revelation would be lawful if the
potential harm to the recipient of the secret is
much more serious than the harm which dis-
closure would cause to the owner of the secret
(and for this opinion Molina is cited); and (c)
The third view is the converse of the first, and
is called by St. Alphonsus the more common
and more probable opinion (and for it he cites
Laymann, Soto, Lessius, Navarrus, DeLugo,
Sporer and others).
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opinion of St. Alphonsus would permit the
professional person to reveal the profes-
sional secret in order to protect himself
from grave harm, if we accept Lehmkuhl's
statement that the saint is referring to the
professional secret; although Lehmkuhl
adds on his own account that the opinion
should be restricted to those cases wherein
the proprietor of the secret is the unjust
cause of the harm that threatens the recipi-
ent of the secret.44 Among more modern
authors, a number share the view of St.
Alphonsus, 45 while others adhere to the
comparative risk doctrine. 46 Slater and
Marc incline to the principles expressed in
the teachings of Saint Thomas to the effect
that the obligation will usually continue to
be binding when its observance entails
serious loss to the professional person.4 7
As pointed out above, just as the disclosure
of a professional secret is mandatory for
the protection of the bonum commune
aside from personal considerations, so too,
the maintenance of a professional secret is
similarly obligatory regardless of the threat
to the professional person.
In the case where the owner of the se-
cret is the formally unjust cause, the owner
of the secret assumes the role of an "unjust
aggressor," and, normally, unjust aggres-
sion may be resisted to the extent necessary
44 See I LEHMKUHL, THEOLOGIA MORALIS, no.
1444, 3 (1914).
45 See REGAN, PROFESSIONAL SECRECY IN THE
LIGHT OF MORAL PRINCIPLES 108 (1943) for a
listing of the authorities.
46 Proponents of the comparative risk doctrine
would be 2 VERMEERSCH, THEOLOGIAE MORALIS:
PRINCIPIA, RESPONSA, CONSILIA, If, no. 699, II,
2 (1924); see 2 PRUMMER, MANUALE THEOLOGIAE
MORALIS, no. 180, 2a (2d and 3d ed. 1923).
47 1 SLATER, MANUAL OF MORAL THEOLOGY 472,
2 (1908); 1 MARC, INSTITUTIONES MORALES
ALPHONSIANAE, no. 1187 (13th ed. 1906).
to withstand the aggression. Thus, for
example, client retains a prominent crimi-
nal lawyer to defend him in a criminal case
and during the course of the relationship
and before the trial threatens to kill the
attorney if client is found guilty. There
should be no dissent from an opinion which
would permit disclosure of the threat, par-
ticularly where the client has the requisite
reputation or propensity. If in the same
situation the threat were "I'll see that you
are worked over," or "taken care of," the
identical solution would seem to be valid.48
Of course, such threats would not be
protected by the law as privileged com-
munications. Nor would any of the fore-
going principles apply to the 'confessional
secret.
4. Harm to an Innocent Third Person
It is conceivable that the revelation of a
professional secret may be the sole means
of protecting an innocent third person from
grave or very grave harm. What is the
status of the duty of secrecy in such a case?
Where the owner of the secret is not the
formally unjust cause of the evil that
threatens the innocent third person, it
seems to be the settled teaching of the
moral theologians that the duty of secrecy
prevails,4 9 although there is some authority
in favor of compromising the duty when
48 It is not always clear at what point the risk
of grave harm takes on the additional character-
istics so as to present the risk of very grave
harm. Obviously the loss of life or of a sub-
stantial equivalent would be placed in the cate-
gory of very grave harm. The problem is dis-
cussed at some length in the average handbook
of moral theology and in some books on ethics.
49 See REGAN, PROFESSIONAL SECRECY IN THE
LIGHT OF MORAL PRINCIPLES 47 (1943) listing
as authorities Vermeersch, Genicot-Salsmans,
D'Annibale, Bucceroni, Noldin, Ferreres, Slater,
Davis and others.
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the gravest of evils (such as loss of life)
threatens the innocent third person. 50
Where, however, the owner of the secret
is the formally unjust cause of the harm
that threatens the innocent third person,
the case takes on a decidedly different
aspect. Merkelbach voices the thought of
many modern moral theologians in taking
the position that while the common good
regularly demands that the entrusted secret,
and especially the professional secret, re-
-main inviolate, the exception is presented
in the case where the person entrusting the
secret is or may become an unjust aggres-
sor and against whom an innocent person
can be defended. 5 1 Aertnys-Damen, mak-
ing specific eference to the classic case of
the syphillitic young man about to enter
marriage with the unsuspecting young lady,
and refusing to heed the command of the
physician to desist from carrying out his
intention to marry or at least inform the
bride-to-be, states that, ". . . a good many
moralists excuse from the observance of
secrecy, a smaller number urge its keeping,
whence in the practical order the disclosure
of the secret is lawful, but does not seem
to be obligatory."52
It is difficult to be sympathetic to the
point of view which urges the keeping of
secrecy in such cases. The authority to the
contrary is represented by such theologians
as Merkelbach, Vermeersch, Genicot-Sals-
mans, D'Annibale, Bucceroni, Noldin,
Ferreres, Slater and Davis, and the intrinsic
reasons underlying such authority appear
convincing. The case contemplates a per-
50 2 PRUMMER, MANUALE THEOLOGIAE MORALIS,
no. 180, b (2d and 3d ed. 1923).
51 2 MERKELBACH, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE MORALIS,
no. 855, 3c (2d ed. 1935).
52 1 AERTNYS-DAMIEN, THEOLOGIA MORALIs, no.
1235 (13th ed. 1939); 3 id. 3.
son who has become an unjust aggressor.
And just as in other areas of life an unjust
aggressor normally forfeits his rights to the
extent necessary to withstand the aggres-
sion, so in this matter it appears that the
unjust aggressor forfeits his right to secrecy
to the extent necessary to put down the ag-
gression. Thus if a physician cannot per-
suade his tubercular patient to leave his
employment in a restaurant or the attorney
cannot dissuade his client from committing
murder, it is our conviction that the pro-
fessional person is both morally permitted
and gravely obligated in charity to make
use of the secret knowledge to the extent
(but only to the extent) necessary to stop
the aggression effectively. Since the duty
towards the innocent third party is one of
charity only, it would not bind in the face
of proportionately grave inconvenience.5 3
The Policy and Future
of Privileges
From the time in the history of the com-
mon law when privileged communications
were first given sanctuary, considerable
time and learned effort has been devoted to
the problem. These efforts have produced
a variety of fruits; some sweet with favor-
able advocacy, others sweet in their ad-
versity.
Considering the several professions
seriatim, the policy underlying the client's
privilege is so deeply rooted in the law and
so widely acclaimed that one can reason-
ably predict continued recognition of the
53 Father Regan's views are more fully discussed
in a paper entitled "Problems of Professional
Secrecy" delivered at a seminar session of the
Annual Meeting of the Catholic Theological
Society of America held in New York City in
June, 1955.
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presently accepted scope of the privilege. 54
Notwithstanding its wide acceptance, the
wisdom of such a course of action has been
questioned. Bentham, perhaps the greatest
opponent of all privileges, argued that the
innocent client with a righteous cause or
defense does not need the privilege [and
that the guilty should not be given the privi-
lege] to aid in creating a false cause or de-
fense. 55 Dean Wigmore, who favors the
privilege, states that: "Its benefits are all in-
direct and speculative; its obstruction is plain
and concrete."' 56 Similar reaction has been
voiced by Professor McCormick 57 and by
Professor Morgan.58 Professor McCormick
advocates protection of the attorney's duty
to maintain out of court the secrecy of his
client's confidential disclosures, but suggests
that "The present privilege against dis-
closure of such communications in judicial
proceedings, should be made subject to the
exception that the trial judge may require a
particular disclosure if he finds that it is
necessary in the administration of
justice."59
The policy arguments against the recog-
nition of the privilege of the patient, that
confidential information conveyed to a phy-
sician in the course of consultation be not
54 See note 12 supra.
55See 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2291 (3d ed.
1940) citing BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL
EVIDENCE, b. IX, pt. IV, c. 5 (1827).
56 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2291 at page 557 (3d
ed. 1940).
57 MCCORMICK, The Scope of Privilege in the
Law of Evidence, 16 TEX. L. REV. 447, 469
(1938) (suggesting that the probable and desir-
able course of evolution for all privileges is the
path from rule to discretion).
58MORGAN, Foreword, MODEL CODE OF EVI-
DENCE, pp. 19, 20 (1942).
59MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §91, pp. 182, 183
(1954); see note 57 supra.
disclosed in court, appear unchallengeable. 60
Perhaps, as has been suggested, legislatures
in accepting the patient's privilege have been
persuaded by lawyers in the legislature who
in turn are motivated by their reluctance to
deny to the medical profession the recog-
nition which the courts have provided for
the legal profession. The analogy of the two
professions in this respect is more apparent
than real. The patient has ample motive for
full disclosure without the privilege and it
is a rare case where the nature and extent
of the patient's communications will be
conditioned by visions of such communica-
tions being disclosed by his physician in the
courtroom. The rare case concerning the
patient represents the norm to a client.
The Comment to Rule 27 of the UNI-
FORM RULES is significant.
At the 1950 meeting of the national Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws it was voted that the physician-
patient privilege should not be recognized.
Professional ethics give the patient broad
and efficient protection against the dis-
closure of confidences by the doctor outside
of the courtroom. There is grave doubt
whether it is in the public interest to extend
the right of the patient to the closing of the
doctor's lips as a witness in an action where
the condition of the patient is a material
and relevant matter. All privileges are
blockades to the ascertainment of the truth
and should be conservatively and reluc-
tantly granted. Nevertheless, at the 1953
meeting the Conference reversed its previ-
ous action and by a close vote decided to
include the privilege and adopted the rules
of the Model Code of Evidence on that sub-
ject. Rule 27 incorporates the provisions of
Model Code Rules 220 to 223.61
60 See e.g., MCCORMICK, Some High Lights of
the Uniform Evidence Rules, 33 TEX. L. REV.
559, 570 (1955).
61 See note 9 supra.
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Professor McCormick states that "The
Comment . . . is misleading in failing to
mention or explain the fact that the rule is
included in brackets."'62 And he explains his
position as follows: "At the 1950 meeting
the National Conference voted that the
Rules should not recognize the patient's
privilege. Nevertheless, at the 1953 meeting
the Conference voted that the Model Code
version of the privilege be adopted for in-
clusion in the Rules, but to be printed
within brackets. The effect of this, as I
understand it, is that the Conference does
not recommend that the substance of the
provision be adopted, but if the substance is
favored by a state, the Conference recom-
mends the bracketed form." He concludes:
"It [Rule 27] is not an improvement on
the common law, which leaves the door
open to the truth."'63 In the face of these
comments the future of the patient's privi-
lege in the law will have to depend upon
extrinsic considerations.
The last and perhaps the most delicate of
the privileges concerns the priest-penitent
relation. The clarity and persuasiveness of
Bentham's argument on this point leave
little to be desired. He reasons that to com-
pel disclosure would be inconsistent and in-
compatible with religious tolerance.6 4 Dean
Wigmore's position may be stated as
follows: Since the communication originates
in a confidence of secrecy, which confidence
is essential to the relation and deserves rec-
ognition and countenance in a country
where toleration of religion exists by law,
62 See MCCORMICK, Some High Lights of the
Uniform Evidence Rules, 33 TEx. L. REV. 559,
note 58 at page 571 (1955).
63 Id. at page 571.
64 BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE,
b. IX, pt. II, c. VI, pp. 367 ff.
the injury to the penitential relation by
compulsory disclosure would be greater
than the benefit to justice. Accordingly, the
privilege should be recognized. 65
As pointed out above, the legislatures of
seventeen states have not granted the privi-
lege, notwithstanding the fact that the com-
mon law affords no protection. 66 While it
is true that no cases have arisen in recent
years in these jurisdictions in which a priest
has been requested to disclose a confessional
communication, and while it would take an
inexperienced or indiscreet attorney to place
the priest in the position of asserting his
duty of secrecy, it is submitted that this
sacred religious duty should receive statu-
tory recognition, not only for the purpose of
insuring against the infrequent indiscretion,
but also in recognition of the fundamental
rights of mankind. The argument which
purports to deny the privilege to Catholics
because there are other religious denomina-
tions whose ministers and members are not
enjoined by the incidents of the "catholic
confession" (and as such the policy argu-
ments favoring protection are lacking) is as
specious as the argument favoring the denial
of -rights because they are not exercised. It
is apparent that a carefully drafted statute,
giving the trial judge the discretion to
determine whether the penitential communi-
cation meets the several tests suggested by
Wigmore, affords adequate protection for
the jurisprudential interests in the great
majority of cases-a much more just and
practical solution. 67
65 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2396 (3d ed. 1940).
66 See note 10 supra.
67 UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE rule 29; see
note 65 supra.
